US Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites: Thirteenth Emergency Special Session?
Since my previous entry 12 days ago, I have been completely consumed by operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer. In some ways my behavioral health and religious observance have suffered a negative two-week hit, and in other ways they have acquired renewed positive focus. But I will not undertake a relatively self-centered cost-benefit analysis at this time. Nor will I share my thoughts about the eschatological significance of these two operations. That can come later, God willing. I only have a few hours now to drill in with some technical observations for intermediate followers of the UN Security Council's Iran file.
Intermediate Iran file observers will be reasonably familiar with the information provided in Iran: Non-proliferation Briefing at What's In Blue by Security Council Report. President Trump has subsequently announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran (cf. Ceasefire between Israel and Iran agreed after 12-day conflict, Trump says | Fox News). Information from the Iranian side underscores the fluidity of the situation (cf. Iran Foreign Minister: no final ceasefire agreement; if Israel stops, we'll stop | The Times of Israel).
Whether or not a ceasefire takes hold on the ground between Israel and Iran - is it a simultaneous ceasefire or is the aggressor stopping first? - there will still be a UN Security Council meeting at 3 PM Eastern today (Tuesday) to review the implementation of resolution 2231. It's less clear if there will be a vote sometime this week on a draft resolution prepared by China, Pakistan and Russia, but let's say that there is. Such a vote could force the US into another isolating veto and lead to a thirteenth emergency special session of the General Assembly on the subject of Iran's 22 June 2025 letter to the Security Council, i.e., the recent US attack on Iranian nuclear sites (this assumes that the 7 October 2023 Hamas Attack should be the focus of a twelfth emergency special session, as I explained here).
The US is at risk of isolation because it's unknown how many Council members believe the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were an act of aggression that violated Article 2 of the UN Charter. Digging a bit deeper, many Council members may believe President Trump's authorization of a strike on Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in 2020 was also violation of UN Charter Article 2 (cf. U.S. Killing Of Iran's Gen. Soleimani 'Was Unlawful,' U.N. Expert Says | NPR). At the root of the 2231 problem, many Council members may believe Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA was a violation of UN Charter Articles 25 and 48 (cf. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: Legal Authorities and Implications | Congress.gov | Library of Congress).
I do think it's plausible Trump broke international law when he withdrew from the JCPOA. Iran was thereafter entitled under the UN Charter to retaliate through litigation, not through near-weapons-grade uranium enrichment brinkmanship. Surprisingly, Iran first took its case to the International Court of Justice through its Treaty of Amity with the US, and not directly through resolution 2231 itself. Article 36 (1) of the Court's Statute reads:
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
What if the Islamic Republic of Iran had filed its Application Instituting Proceedings under the title "Alleged Violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231"? Why bring the Treaty of Amity into the picture at all?
This was a costly mistake by the Iranians. The US responded by withdrawing from the Treaty of Amity, which only made relations worse (cf. Thoughts on the ICJ’s Decision in Iran v United States and the Trump Administration’s Treaty Withdrawals | Council on Foreign Relations). US withdrawal implied the presumption of an adverse ruling by the Court and fueled Iranian grievance. A more pacific time for the Americans to withdraw from the Treaty of Amity, if absolutely necessary, would have been after the Court's final ruling.
Could and should the Islamic Republic of Iran still submit an Application Instituting Proceedings under the title suggested above?
Perhaps.
But this does not mean I think the Court should necessarily agree with the Iranian position. I would need to hear more of the argument from each side.