Respecting US Logic and Veto Power at the UN Security Council

I've maintained silence for a week since I published Finding My Voice in the Extended UN Security Council Peacemaking Circle. During that time, Hamas has refused to accept the terms of a ceasefire proposal recommended to it by American, Egyptian, and Qatari mediators. Israel has agreed to the proposal while continuing its new offensive in Gaza. The strategic wisdom - if not plausible military necessity - of this new offensive is debatable, even among patriotic Israeli security analysts. Is it just an unfortunate coincidence that Netanyahu seems to need the continuation of the war to keep his coalition afloat? How does this structural coincidence intersect with allegations by South Africa at the International Court of Justice that Israel has genocidal intent? On the ground in Gaza, it's unclear whether the humanitarian situation has gotten better or worse over the last seven days because independent media access is restricted by the Israeli government and there has been a great deal of spoiler gunfire at new aid distribution sites (cf. Who's shooting whom near Rafah's aid center, and who's exploiting the bloodshed | The Times of Israel).

Within this context, I have to ask whether yesterday's UN Security Council vote on a draft text by the E-10 was well-conceived. Would it have been better for the Security Council to respect the logic and veto power of the US position by avoiding an isolating vote in favor of a consensus resolution? (Cf. US vetoes Security Council resolution demanding permanent ceasefire in Gaza | UN News and The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question - Security Council, 9929th meeting | UN Web TV).

From a US and Israeli point of view, it would have been infinitely more intelligent and credible if the UN Security Council had avoided isolating the US - and by implication Witkoff. It would have been much, much wiser if the UN Security Council had tabled a consensus resolution calling on both Israel and Hamas to work within the framework proposed by the mediators to get a second phase ceasefire back on track. I am sure the US would have liked nothing more than to vote in support of a reasonably well-balanced consensus resolution. 

From Pakistan's point of view, on the other hand, the genius of this vote was the way in which isolated the US, and perhaps the Trump administration specifically, for charges of complicity and/or negligence with respect to a Palestinian genocide. Will Pakistan now bring the US to the ICJ on the grounds that the American exercise of the veto in this UN Security Council vote was a violation of US responsibilities under the Genocide Convention?

This gets at the question of whether the veto right enshrined in Article 27 of the UN Charter is absolute, or is in some ways constrained, and if the latter is the case, what should be the rest of the UN Security Council's remedy when this constraint is exceeded? Perhaps it would help to have an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on this issue.