Midnight Hammer: Collective Defense Under Article 51 of the UN Charter

Earlier today I listened in real time to Non-Proliferation (Iran) Security Council 9944th Meeting | UN Web TV. I thank the President of the Council, the briefers, and all of the delegations who participated in this meeting for their tireless efforts with respect to resolution 2231. It's a complex resolution and I am humbled by the thousands of peace and security practitioners who have been hard at work over the last decade at an advanced level of 2231 study and implementation. I am an ignoramus in comparison, but I nonetheless feel called by God to keep somewhat up to speed with this file.

The IAEA Board of Governors appears positioned to adopt a resolution referring Iran back to the Security Council at some point between September 2025 and December 2026 if Iran remains within the NPT but continues refusing to disclose the truth about its historical AMAD Project (cf. IAEA board declares Iran in breach of non-proliferation obligations | Reuters). 

In the meantime, the UK or France could trigger the 2231 snapback mechanism, but this doesn't seem likely to happen until after Pakistan's presidency in July (cf. Path to Snapback | JINSA). 

The next step by the Council related to the Iran nuclear file might be a vote later this week on an updated draft resolution prepared by China, Pakistan and Russia. But will this resolution fall under the Council agenda item "Threats to International Peace and Security: Iran," or under the Council agenda item "Nonproliferation: Iran"? It's possible that what we could see from China, Pakistan and Russia moving forward is not an immediate Iran-Israel ceasefire resolution before the end of June but a complete successor to resolution 2231 before the end of July.  

Said another way, I think the Council might have until the end of July to develop a 2231 successor resolution that is better for everyone than snapback, otherwise the UK and/or France might feel compelled to trigger snapback in August, distasteful as snapback may seem to many Council members.

If China, Pakistan and Russia do move ahead with an immediate Iran-Israel ceasefire resolution sometime before the end of June, and if the goal is Council consensus, it seems important that the draft resolution acknowledge both the Iranian/Russian side of the argument and the Israeli/American side of the argument. It is one thing to regret an escalation in an ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel, and it is quite another to condemn one of the sides. The Council should not be rushing to judgment. The American justification for Operation Midnight Hammer based on Article 51 of the UN Charter is remarkably strong in this case, but so is the Russian counterclaim of an Article 2 violation. Peoples of great intelligence and good will can constructively disagree on the practical implications of UN Charter implementation when nuclear security problems of the utmost complexity are under consideration.