Military Necessity and Gideon's Chariots

I am going back and forth on Gideon's Chariots, defending Prime Minister Netanyahu and the IDF against the charge of genocidal intent, on one hand, while questioning the strategic wisdom of the operation, on the other. Yesterday, I suggested that Gideon's Chariots is a military necessity, in the continued absence of a Hamas surrender or a UN Security Council Chapter VII intervention. Today I want to probe this notion of military necessity. Does it hold up to third millennium Christian Zionist UN Charter engineering standards, or has Israel so fundamentally changed the contours of the seven-front conflict with Iran during the Swords of Iron phase, and has the international legal context evolved so much since the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, and are the odds of live hostage rescue by military means so low, that Israel simply had and has no good military reason to break the latest ceasefire with Hamas? Does Gideon's Chariots lack military necessity under international humanitarian law?  

This question challenges me to think about military necessity in a complex UN Charter context. At the highest strategic level, we want to move the world toward general disarmament, diverting the fewest resources possible to military spending, consistent with Article 26 of the Charter. But this is long-term idealpolitik, not short-term realpolitik. In the real world of near-term horizons, diverse and interdependent perceptions of military necessity apply. Hamas perceived the construction of a massive tunnel network as a military necessity. Israel views the destruction of that tunnel network as a military necessity. How should the UN Security Council view the Hamas tunnel network? How does the World Bank view it - good economic stewardship by the leaders of Palestine, or a crime against humanity?

When 7 October 2023 happened, did Hamas as a de facto governing branch of the de jure State of Palestine breach the peace? Or was Israel already in breach of the peace as an illegally occupying settler white capitalist colonial power backed by America? Was 7 October 2023 an act of military necessity by an indigenous eco-socialist decolonizing axis of color backed by the Communist Party of China? (Cf. ICJ rules that ending Palestine’s occupation is a global undertaking | ISS Africa).

I perceive the strategic chess match between American and Chinese narratives, but I don't subscribe to either of the above cartoon simplifications. From my perspective, 7 October 2023 was a seismic breach of the peace - of the local and regional modus vivendi, if not the status quo - and the UN Security Council was obligated to respond, first with a straightforward condemnation, then with a demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, and then with a Chapter VII intervention, or at least a call on Israel to abide by the principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality in its legitimate application of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Israel, for its part, was obligated to provide the UN Security Council with a notification of its intent to engage in self-defense operations against the observer state of Palestine (including or specifically the Hamas branch of this government) consistent with its Article 51 obligations (cf. The UN Soleimani Report and the U.S. Article 51 Notification | Lieber Institute West Point).

In contrast to my point of view, there are many UN member states that see Palestine since 1967 as an illegally occupied Arab state with a right to armed resistance. As some of these countries see it, the IDF is not entitled to a security response to Palestinian terrorism at all, at least not anywhere in Gaza and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, on the grounds that Article 51 of the UN Charter does not apply in the case of an illegal occupation (cf. Does Israel Have the Right to Defend Itself?) These countries have not denounced the October 7 Hamas terror attack. Nor have they condemned ongoing Hamas behavior since October 7, including the holding and trading of hostages, though Palestinian President Abbas has recently come close (cf. Palestinian Authority president calls Hamas ‘sons of dogs,’ demands release of hostages and disarmament | CNN).

The US government does not recognize Palestine as a state. I don't know what I am obligated to think about this yet, in part according to the relevant ICJ advisory opinions, especially the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 on Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. France and the UK are moving toward recognition of Palestinian statehood in June (cf. UK joins France's initiative for recognition of Palestinian state and France pressures allies to recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN summit). I don't think they are doing this because they want to hold Palestine accountable for genocide at the ICJ (cf. Holding Hamas Accountable at the ICJ Through Palestine | Lawfare).

Is the 19 July 2024 ruling by the ICJ "merely" an advisory opinion? How much weight am I obligated to give the dissent of Judge Sebutinde? I wish I could spend a few weeks studying with former ICJ Judge Joan Donoghue.

I want to agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that the IDF is the most moral military service in the history of modern urban warfare (cf. Israeli PM Netanyahu holds first presser in 5 months). This appeals to my Christian Zionist UN Charter idealism. At the same time, I don't want to hold the IDF to a hyperinflated moral standard. Likewise, I can imagine a continuum - a scale - of military necessity. Surely the objective military necessity at the start of Swords of Iron was greater than the objective military necessity at the start of Gideon's Chariots.